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The internat ional financial crisis brought Russia's run of economic growth to a hal t and 
has given a greater sense of urgency to President Medvedev's calls for modernization. 
This, however, does not mean that crisis has changed Russia or its political economy. 
Russia's economic system is a form of patrimonial capital ism, a particular form of 
15 patrimonial ism created when patrimonial systems refonn under the influence of 
global economic forces. Russian patr imonial capital ism developed in the 1990s and 
stabilized under Putin. This type of capital ism is hard to change and does not tend to 
promote economic modernization or diversification. The crisis has so far not fatally 
wounded th is system, and this will make future reform harder to secure. 
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How much change has the international economic crisis brought about in 
Russia? Did the crisis lead to a change in Ihe potential for economic 
refonn? Did it, as wi th crises elsewhere in emerging markets, I change the 
way in which the Russian economy relates to the global economy, and did 
it do so in a way that reduces the options for Russia's leaders, forcing them 
to follow new policies? 
The answer to these questions seems to be 'yes'. The crisis brought to an 
end the rapid growth of the Russian economy that followed the 1998 crisis and 
pushed Russia into recession; any growth over the next few years (except 
where caused by major spikes in energy prices) is likely to be modest. A 
change in economic direction would thus appear inevitable and it is not su r-
prising that the crisis has consolidated a change in the way in which economic 
policy is discussed in Russia. 'Modernization' was on the political agenda 
before the crisis, but crisis made it a fix ture of political discourse_ Commonly, 
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modernization mean s both the updating of Russia 's industrial infrastructure 
and the diversification of its budget revenue and export earnings away from 
a reliance on oil and gas. President Dmitrii Medvedev has repeated endlessly 
a mantra of 'we cannot rely on hydrocarbon s alone,.2 Medvedev has also tied 
45 energy dependency and crisis together. In his 2009 presidential address to the 
Federal Assembly, he argued that the crisis hit Russia harder than 'most 
countries' as a direct result of dependency on oil and gas and Russia's 
failure to move to a diversified economy exporting a variety of high-val ue 
goods.3 Modernization is thus designed to end Russia's old relationship 
50 with the global economy and the power structures around this and create a 
new relationship. 
Medvedev is right the crisis did hit Russia very hard and its vulnerability 
to crisis was in large part a result of its dependency on oil and gas sales to fund 
its state budget and generate its current-account surplus and national develop-
55 ment funds.4 But intellectual and rhetorical acceptance that Russia has to 
change is not change in practice. It is an open question whether the crisis fun-
damentally altered the structure of power in the Russian economy, its political 
economy, and as a result began the process of institutionalizing new ideas 
about development that will break the hydrocarbon dependency of the past 
and forge a new relationship with the global economy. 
Russia's economic prospects, we argue, will not change greatly because 
the crisis has not yet brought about a fundamental change in the structure of 
Russia's political economy. To demonstrate this, we will apply the idea of 
palrimonial capitalism to Russia. Contrary to the usual ways of describing 
65 Russia as a version of state capitalism or corporatism, or some combination':' 
this approach argues that under Putin, Russia achieved a type of stability rather 
than elaborating a state-led model for development. Thus, the fonn of Russia's 
political economy is the problem and not the solution. This is already recog-
nized by part of the Russian political establishment, hence the calls for mod-
70 emization.6 The patrimonial capitalist system has been in place since the 
1990s, but stabilized only in the next decade as it supported itself on high 
hydrocarbon prices and looked for its development to global capital mixed 
wi th national resource wealth. It had achieved a short-tenn equilibrium, and 
was possibly on the verge of moving beyond this. The crisis removed that 
75 possibility and the response to it was to restore equilibrium and preselVe the 
state's role as a mediator between the domestic and the global economy. 
This may make future refonn harder. Sources of investment capital are 
now much shrunken, thanks to the attrition of reselVes and the uncertainties 
facing global investors as the crisis works its way through the world 
80 economy. In these conditions, the political risks of creating a developmental 
regime and breaking with the patrimonial capitalist system are high since 
they mean an attack on that system rather than its Ifansmutation through 
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development in which there are resources both for 'partners' in palrimoniaiism 
and for the establishment of new economic sectors thai can, in lime, replace as 
sources of political power Ihose resource and other sectors thai are the bedrock 
of palrimoniaiism. 
Patrimonial Capitalism 
Russia is a 'political capi tal ist' system and this needs 10 beconceplualized.7 The 
usual approach is 10 argue thai it is a fonn of Siale capi tal ism, bUllhis is an ill-
defined concept and one IhallOO readily accepts the logic of Put in ism. This logic 
inflates Ihe break between the Yeltsin and Putin eras and assumes Ihal a growth 
in power in the Kremlin equates 10 some changed ability 10 manage Russia's 
economy. Naturally, changes look place after Yeltsin, bUllhese were and are 
reified by analysts into a sol ution to the problems that Russia faced in integmt-
95 ing with the global economy both by Putin and by the state-capi talist approach. 
The refonnist agenda of the early 1990s, for all its faults, recognized that Russia 
had to change the way it related to the global economy, and that Russia had to 
c hange in order to achieve this goal. Under Putin, economic nationalism, tied to 
notions of 'sovereign democracy', made out that Russiacould dictate the tenns 
100 of its relations with the global economy, thanks to the power of the state. There 
is nothing wrong wi th aspiring to some autonomy from the global economy, but 
believing that it had been attained in Russia ignored the weaknesses of the 
Russian economy, particularly its need for investment, the underdevelopment 
of its financial system and continued relat ive technological backwardness. In 
105 tum, this perpetuated Russia's dependency on energy sales for economic stab-
ility and growth. It also underplayed the political problems associated wi th 
achieving broader integration into the global economy, both under Yeltsin 
and subsequently.8 It conceived of the state as an entity sufficiently powerful 
to dictate the tenns on which engagement would take place. The vel)' fact 
110 that Russia was so harmed by the crisis of 2008 onwards shows this not to 
have been the case. The crisis was not just a crisis of nco-liberal ism, as has 
been widely touted, but a crisis of a 'state capitalist' sol ution of Russia's 
problems, too. as Medvedev now recognizesY 
An alternative approach is the concept of patrimonial capitalism. Patrimo-
115 nial capitalism is produced when patrimonial fonns of political and economic 
organization, where power over the economy is highly personalized and econ-
omic exchange is particularistic and involves hig h degrees of relational 
capital, are forced to undergo market refonn. This refonn is often exogenous 
in source, forced on to a patrimonial or nco-patrimonial system by external 
120 lenders or agencies, or because of relative competi tive economic failure. lO 
The result is different both from tmditional patrimonialism, based on 
pre-modem, highly personalistic legitimating devices as described by Max 
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Weber, and from neo-palrimonialism, where tmditional political structures sit 
alongside modem bureaucratic structures, but the economy remains relatively 
closed. I I In the latter system, the tension is between the tmditional appropria-
tion of property as personal wealth and the directive, modernizing power of 
125 modem state structures, but the state is not subject to external economic 
pressure. Patrimonial capitalism is a variant of this system as market logics 
and global economic competition are added to the mix of tmditional persona-
listic and state-bureaucratic modes of domination. Hence palrimonial capital-
ism is an 'emergent economic order'; it is a development that has occurred as 
130 the relatively autarkic palrimonial states of the past have been put under 
increasing pressure through processes of economic globalization. 12 Patrimo-
nial capitalism has some of the features of neo-palrimonialism in that it has 
bureaucratic structures that are 'modem' - that is they are hierarchical and 
subject to some degree of legal rationality - but cannot achieve the level of 
135 economic closure that in the past may have been associated with bureaucratic 
domination or rraditionalism. Connections to global markets and capital put 
pressure on political and bureaucratic elites to adapt and may also be resources 
that national actors can draw on. In tum, however, these connections cannot 
easily develop into more libeml capitalism because of the ways in which 
140 the political illiberality and the personal basis of palrimonialism limit the 
global penetration of markets and market nonns. 
Patrimonial capitalism as a Weberian ideal type thus stands at one end of 
the spectrum of 'palrimonialism'. At the other end is traditional patrimonial-
ism, where legitimating power is rraditional and personal. Neo-patrimonialism 
145 rests in the middle, with tmdition blended with state bureaucracy and some 
idea of a rational-legal, neutral state administration in tension with rradition. 
Patrimonial capitalism is at the other end, with personalism and state-bound 
rational legality in tension with one another, and with market mtionality 
imposed from without by global price structures, capital and tmde flows. 13 
150 Leaders in such systems can rule through each or a combination of these 
modes of legitimation. They can rely on the purely personal, tmditional clien-
telist system, or on an appeal to a modernizing bureaucratic impersonalism or 
to the demands created by global competition, or then can rry to combine them 
in some way, by, say, creating areas of economic activity that are globalized 
155 and then using that to fund ciientelism, or appealing to bureaucratic modern-
ization as a means to deal with the demands of external economic forces, and 
using this appeal to srrengthen their hand againstrraditional groups. However, 
no matter what the style of rule, patrimonial capitalism remains a fonn of 
illibeml capitalism, with five main features: 
I'" 
I. fonnal and infonnal rules (laws on the one hand, and values and behaviour-
al patterns on the other) are not mutually supportive but work against one 
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another, wi th the infonnal often laking precedence owing 10 the impor-
tance of personal loyalty; fonnal rules are often used 10 punish the disloyal; 
2. economic power rests in those sectors were elites dominate; Ihese are 
resistanllO outside penetration since in the absence of the rule of law prop-
165 erty and conlJ'aCI rights are best secured through personal connection s, the 
development of which is highly costly 10 'outsiders'; 
3. transaction costs are high owing 10 the costs of securing rights wi thin a 
fonnal framework thai sets oul rights, but probably does not prolecllhem; 
4. the pace and nature of any refonn serves elite interests, and these interests 
170 delennine what refonn can happen; 
5. polilicalleadership is not subject 10 democratic conslrainl. 14 
The combination of these features makes it vel)' difficult for a patrimonial 
capitalist system eilher 10 transi l 10 liberal capitalism or 10 achieve develop-
175 men!. Polilics mediates between the global economy and the national to con-
strain the influence of the fonner. The movement of an economic tran si lion 
requires either a political break 10 destroy control over the economy by the 
patrimonial elite, or an economic break 10 introduce new actors, from 
outside or from wi thin, powerful enough to supplant the elite and rewrite 
ISO the political rules. Patrimonial capitalism blocks these developments 
because of the power that rests within the elite and because of the costs that 
would be involved in tackling elite factions. Moving decisively beyond patri-
monial capitalism would require either a change of regime, or a decisive move 
to build up the state as an agent of social and economic tran sfonnation, or a 
185 major external shock that forced change. Modernization, in other words, has 
political requirements that are very difficult to achieve, or that need to be 
imponed, and is a threat to stability since it threaten s any balance that 
exists between elite interests wi thin the palrimonial system. 
Patrimonial capitalism thus throws up a classic problem of development 
190 the extent to which development can occur depends on the degree to which 
institutions can be put in place to overcome traditional obstacles - economic, 
social or political, or some combination thereof - to growth; such institutions 
are necessal)' to move resources from what Gerschenkron called 'old wealth' 
to invesnnent, or to facilitate inflows of investment from abroad. 15 At the same 
195 time, the stability of patrimonial capitalism depends on the degree to which 
development and external pressures for change can be contained. Either 
may undennine a patrimonial regime by threatening flows of resources or 
by creating new socio-political actors wilh access to external capital. There 
are, therefore, inherent tensions wi thin patrimonial capitalism as a fonn of pol-
200 itical economy shaped by interaction wi th the global economy. Internally there 
is a tension between regime maintenance, economic development and secur-
ing resources to maintain state functions. Externally, the global economy 
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and slructuml pressures compete to produce patrimonial capitalism and, at the 
same time, expose its weaknesses to put the issue of modernization on the pol-
itical agenda. The domestic interests of elite factions and of rulers constrain 
demands for modernization, or try to structure them in a way that is politically 
205 not contentious, and seek to isolate and control the disciplining effects of the 
global economy. Some action for economic development is generally poss-
ible: states may have some resid ual power to shift resources from consumption 
to investment. However, this does not guarantee either prolonged develop-
ment - that is, flows of resources to investment over time - or intensive devel-
210 opment - that is, development that is supported not only by the transfer of 
resources from consumption to investment but also by growth genemted by 
cost efficiency, raised labour productivity, and the production of goods of 
higher value that can support diversified (from primary and simple manufac-
tures) export-led growth. Achieving development that is prolonged, intensive 
215 (or both) requires overcoming any arrangements put in place in the past to 
contain political divisions, generally as well as specifically over development. 
Where there has been political division in general, or where development has 
been politicized to shore up policy preferences in other areas, the co-option of 
actors from a wider society to stabilize power will broaden the base of the 
220 regime and equalize the claims of consumption and investment. This makes 
development through the state hamer, since the tendency is towards creating 
equilibrium through policies of economic inclusion that predate the growth of 
sustainable and advanced industrial economy anrl of rational-legal adminis-
trative structures. In these circumstances, political and redislributive equilibria 
225 become substitutes for growth, and relations wi th the global economy are 
managed so that their promotion of change is conrrolled. 16 
The obstacles to launching development in a palrimonial capitalist system 
are therefore great, and the incentives to backtrack from development are 
numerous. Where this happens, the state does not developeither the autonomy 
230 or the capacity to force development. The problems that this can cause may be 
recurrent. They might be evaded for a time so that growth ensues; but unless 
this leads to a change in the state's general capacity - and specifically in its 
ability to create incentives for economic actors to generate higher labour pro-
ductivity, invest in high-val ue production and so forth, or means of imposing 
235 discipline if they fail to do so - these problems are likely to re-surface. 
There is, in other words, a high degree of path dependency that fixes patri-
monial capitalism in place. However, that fix depends on the tying of elites to 
the system. If there are not enough resources available to fix palrimonialism in 
place, then efforts at co-option will fail. Alternatively, there may be such 
240 resources for a time, but if they disappear or are reduced, then the patrimonial 
system is open to pressure to change, again from - potentially - both internal 
sources such as dissatisfied client groups and external sources including 
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funding bodies. 17 Refonn might, of course, be avoided: an undemocratic gov-
e rnment can ride the sionn by relying on coercion and squeezing the general 
population 10 maintain payments 10 client groups. The outcomes of these pol-
icies are potentially cosily, however, since Ihey further discourage investment 
245 (OUI of fear of appropriation, for example, or lack of domestic demand for 
local products because of wider economic inequality), or raise the costs of 
invesnnenl further (since personal and panicularistic relations thai need 10 
be decoded 10 see if investment is a good risk become more opaque). The 
danger here is thai the patrimonial system reaches a c risis point: the amount 
250 needed 10 maintain patrimony plus the amount needed 10 maintain basic 
Siale functions is greater than the amount that can be appropriated by a patri-
monial regime domestically and borrowed internationally. The source of these 
problems can arise internally or externally. The fonn of crisis and its outcomes 
are immaterial; the important point is that, if such a si tuation arises, a patrimo-
255 nial capi talist system becomes inherently unstable, ruther than turning into a 
stable political economy able to reproduce itself economically and politically. 
Russia as a Case of Patrimonial Capitalism 
260 Russia is an obvious fit wi th the five features of patrimonial capitalism listed 
above: Russia has had difficulties making fonnal rules stick; its main econ-
omic sectors, oil and metals, have been dominated by 'oligarchs' and by 
members of the political elite; the costs of doing business are high for outsi-
ders (hence the comparatively low rates of foreign investment) and uncertain 
265 for insiders (hence the fli ght of capi tal); refonn has been slow and there is 
weak political accountability. But this fit does not tell us how far Russia's 
patrimonial system is capable of resisting crisis and pressure for further 
refonn. To gauge this, we need to look at the origins of patrimonial capi talism, 
since these will go some way to explaining its resilience: they show how 
270 embedded it is. A greater sense of its resilience can be acquired by looking 
at the resources that can be commanded through the patrimonial system and 
the demands upon those resources. What these together show is that, after 
the difficulties it experienced at birth in the 1990s, Russian patrimonial capi t-
alism achieved a stability in the past decade as an equilibrium was reached, 
275 thanks to the revenues from hydrocarbons, and as the political battles to 
control, these were resolved in favour of the Russian political authorities. 
However, this equilibrium was fragile, as the crisis showed, and its preser-
vation, and that of the state's role, was the aim of the anti-crisis measures 
launched in 2008-9. 
280 The roots of Russia's patrimonial capitalism lie in its peculiar mixture of 
traditionalism , modem bureaucratic structures and globalized economy. 
Russia had a particularly patrimonial fonn of communism, where personalism 
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and c1ientelism significantly and simultaneously undercut and supjX)rted the 
fonnal bureaucratic hierarchies of the party-state. L8 The collapse of the 
Soviet system left the tasks before a modern state bureaucracy unchanged -
the provision of securi[y ooth domestically and internationaJly, welfare and 
~ sociaJ management - but emlXlwered netwon:.s of personalism and cliente-
lism, which expanded 10 try to secure property and economic advantage as 
a control over the Soviet economy declined. L9 There was thus an imperative 
at the start of Russian independence to re-create state bureaucratic IXlwer 
and structures, and develop anew formal rules governing social management 
~ and economic relations, but these were at odds with informaJ structures. 
Furthermore., there was an impetus to build fonnal IXllitical institutions and 
establish impersonaJ rules as part of the development of Russian democracy, 
which again was at odds with personalism. To these were added the externally 
generated economic model of capitaJism to which Russia was forced to 
}5 accommodate itself owing to its economic collapse and the lack of any cred-
ible alternatives. Russia's economic transition was in large part designed 
externally and much of the intention of, and struggle over, refonn was con-
cerned with the problem of aligning Russian and global price structures so 
that Russian industry was subject 10 the discipline of the global market and 
Xl its commercializin g pressures.2() 
The IXlliticaJ economy that developed over the Yelts in years was thus 
shaped by Soviet legacies, which were patrimonial, by extemaJ economic 
pressure, and by the maintenance of fonnaJ bureaucratic institutions in 
on:ier ooth to fulfil state functions and 10 build democracy. The form of patri-
)5 monial capitalism that emerged was highly unstable. Yelrsin swung between, 
on the one hand, reslXlnding to andjustifying reform in tenns of the demands 
o f the global economy and calling for the bureaucratic impersonalism of the 
state to be developed to reslXlnd to these demands, and, on the other hand, 
using the globaJ economy and the state as resources to shore up his personaJ 
to rule. Hence the economy was opened up first through the liberalization of 
trade and later through the opening of government debt markers to fo reigners; 
pri vatization and commercialization policies based on cuts to subsidies were 
supposed to increase the IXlwer of the state throu gh developing its fisen] 
controL But these developments were all compromised. Trade concessions, 
t5 created for IXllitical reasons, undennined trade liberalization and commercia-
lization; foreign investment in the debt market was used to transfer resources 
to oligarch-controlled banks; and privatization and commercialization were 
opjX)rtunistically undennined by insiders and re-created 10 sustain infonnaJ 
networks of IXlwer. Refonn , as a result, swung between failure and hesitant 
20 restarts. The laller were prompted by the state's continuing fiscal crisis, on 
the one hand, and the demands of internationaJ financial institutions and 
lenders, on the other, which forced efforts at refonn that then ran up against 
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the roc ky shores of regime maintenance as Yeltsin struggled 10 hold on 10 
office and authority. Consequently, the economy was nOI he ld in a stable equi-
librium, neither was it able 10 create the conditions fo r growth. Equilibrium 
was created, undennined, re-created and undennined again. This cycle was 
325 dri ven by the conlest for conrrol over resources between the Siale (whether 
for purposes of development or for parronage) and economic and other 
e lites (the so-called o ligarchs and regional leaders in particular). The 
conlest was unresolved because of the political chaos, the large number of 
actors making claims on resources, and the undersupply of resources 10 be dis-
330 tribuled. The global economy and its structures were a resource called on and 
used by di fferent actors so that refonn continued, at least symbolically, 
through the presence of refonners in the government. This made it easier 
for external agencies and government to provide some financial aid, but the 
effects of aid were limi ted, supporting the Yeltsin regime rather than promot-
335 ing growth. 
Putin 's Achievement: The Stabilization of Patrimonial Capitalism 
This situation changed towards the end of the Yeltsin era and under Putin, and 
340 created both political and economic conditions for the relati ve stabilization of 
Russia's palrimoni al capitalism. Part of this stabi lization was then protected 
during the global economic crisis, in stead of the crisis bringing about the 
e nd of the Russian version of patrimoni al capitalism. The stabi lization was 
based first on conrrolling the number of actors who could make claims on 
345 resources, or on the extent of their claims, or both. Second, it was based on 
a g rowth in the amount of resources that could be shared out, so that conflict 
could be scaled down and did not upset political stabili ty. Stabilization was 
thus contingent upon a number of political and economic fac tors coming 
together, rather than upon deep-seated change under Putin. 
350 Politically the story of the stabilization is well known. Putin 's selection 
and election as Yeltsin's successor did no t involve the same negotiation 
over support that had marked Yeltsin's 1996 re-election a nd his earlier fight 
for survival against parliament (1993). Once Putin had won the preside ncy 
in 2000, he used his mandate to re-create central political authority, at first 
355 by taming the 'oligarchs' (by the making, for example, of Vladimir Gusinksii 
and Boris Berezovskii) and then by expanding the parameters of ' managed 
democracy'. This re-creation of political autho rity was a continuing process 
that used Putin 's personal popularity, opportunities such as those presented 
by the Chechen conflict, manipulation of electoral rules, and so forth, to 
360 limit as far as possi ble the claims that could be made on Putin and the state. 
Economically, the g rowth of Russia's economy expl ains stabi lization to a 
certain degree: there was more to share so less to fight over, espec ially 
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since the political costs of fighting might be higher if it displeased the Kremlin. 
But the stabilization was wider and more inclusive as it produced equilibrium 
through economic inclusion and social pacification. This equilibrium wea-
kened efforts to promote growth in areas where Russia might have a compara-
365 tive advantage in high-val ue goods, or to force the development of greater 
economic efficiency. After the crisis of 1998, growth was initially driven by 
the devaluation of the rouble; subsequently much of the growth that occurred 
was due to the boom in hydrocarbon prices, but this did not lead to the diver-
sification of the economy or to its modernization. Much of the investment in 
370 the early 2000s was in the energy sector, with growth in output in other sectors 
coming from under-utilized capacity brought back online after the sl ump of 
the I 99Os.2 I Foreign direct investment remained comparatively low and 
Russia's competitiveness did not improve either generally or in comparison 
with other emerging market economies. 22 Growth was thus spectacular, but 
375 its base, as the OECD has noted, rested more on 'temporary factors' than 
on deep-seated structural change; the government's role was limited, based 
on restraint in spending ruther than on the promotion of developmenl.23 In 
other words, the Russian government did not cause growth: it just Slopped 
the economy from overheating. The institutional bases of development 
380 remained weak, in particular the development of the Russian financial 
system, where the state began to squeeze out private banks but did not 
resolve the problem of the availability of credit to Russian business. 
Foreign investment was frequently not foreign but came from tax havens to 
which Russian money had been directed in order to avoid taxes.24 The 
385 foreign investment and borrowing that did occur to compensate for the weak-
ness of domestic lending went to the large enterprises in export sectors (mostly 
energy and metals), or was spent not on modernization, but on asset acqui-
si tion and mergers, frequently overseas. Russia's economic success did not, 
therefore, mimic that of China, where domestic savings and foreign capital 
390 combined to restructure and diversify the economy continuously ancl have 
added high-val ue production. Instead, and in essence, Putin stabilized the 
economy inherited from Yehsin and bent the political relations that it had 
contained in order to serve this stability. There were several dimensions to 
this new stability. 
395 First, it was based on incomplete refonn. Economic refonn was often com-
promised by the poverty of public adminislfation and because of political risk. 
The monetization of welfare benefits is a case in point: poor public aclminis-
tration meant that much of the refonn could not be implemented, and certain 
key provisions of the policy were delayed after protest and as regional govern-
400 ments were unable to aclminister the policy.25 Building up power within the 
Kremlin did not Ifanslate into the development of the state as an engine for 
economic management and change. Putin 's achievement was in a narrow 
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political field of regime consolidation rather than in the larger field of stale 
building. There was, of course, some spill-over between the processes of 
regime consolidation and stale building, since success in consolidating 
power in the Kremlin unified decision-making 10 a certain extent and gave 
405 Pulin a higher degree of autonomy than Yeltsin had possessed. But this is 
not the same thing as developing state capaci ty. 
This can be seen in Figure I, which records changes in Russia's World 
Bank Governance indicators, here aggregated into two measures., one for 
democratic governance, and one for economic and public govemance.26 The 
410 World Bank scores governance on a scale from - 2.5 10 +2.5, wi th a 
higher positive score indicating better governance. 
The initial move from Yeltsin to Putin led to improvements in both 
measures, as some of the grosser personal and family abuses of power 
e nded. However, the move to consolidate regime, marked by the falling 
415 score for democratic governance, did not produce a corresponding develop-
ment of the state's capaci ty, which would have produced a higher economic 
and public governance score: initially the laller indicator rose as the fonner 
fell, but this did not last and gradually the two began to converge. What 
this tells us is that in effect Putin built up the regime's srreng th so as to 
420 achieve negati ve power: he was better able to stop things from being done 
than to do them. The things that were 'stopped ' were in particular the 
demands placed on the government under Yeltsin by economic interests. 
Putin was able to control these, partly because the hydrocarbon boom meant 
that there were sources of abundant rent apart from the state, and partly 
425 because the consolidation of the regime meant that he could fend off calls 
for increased spending. Unlike Yeltsin, Putin did not have to barter for 
430 
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support. Thus, there was fi scal prudence under Putin, which had some positive 
e ffects: it helped to conlfol inflation to a certain degree and to deaden ' Dutch 
d isease' effects that might have been expected, given the large current account 
surplus generated by high oil prices. However, this did not amount to the Ifans-
445 fonnation of Russia by the state as an institutional ensemble with the capacity 
to get things done. The state was as much as a bamer to development as its 
fac ilitator. Low state capac ity complicated such things as foreign investment. 
Actions again st Yukos and the experiences of Shell and BP supported patrimo-
nial capitalism by weakening property rights and raising the costs of entry into 
450 the Russian economy. Both Putin and Medvedev recognized this when they 
began to talk about mode rn ization before the financial crisis took hold, and 
as Putin tried to move from regime consolidation and negative, blocking 
power, to a more positive use of power through national development projects 
and corpomtions in 2007. 
455 Secooo, there was a continued lag in the adjusnnent of domestic energy 
prices to international market prices, so that the subsidies to industl)' remained 
in place. This perpetuated a key pl ank of what had been the 'virtual economy' 
under Yeltsin, tmn sferring value from the energy sectors to the rest of the 
economy, and in particular to the highly energy-inefficient industrial 
460 economy.v Under Yeltsin, this had led to demonetization, the non-payment 
of taxes and wages, o r their payment in kind. These were now paid in money, 
thanks in part to tax refonn, and also because of the remonetization caused by 
the 1998 c risis and the g reater wealth created by the energy booms. The first 
boom that funded subsidies was the merciless exploitation of rents by their 
465 pri vate owners in 2000-4. The ex port value of o il, gas and metals nearl y 
doubled in dollar tenns between 1998 and 2002. This was due partly to increased 
prices and partly to increased expon volumes, as economic actors cashed in on 
assets acquired under Yehsin. In 2000, oil expons were 17 1.5 per cent of what 
they had been in 1999; this level of output was maintained in 2001 and then 
470 expanded again in 2002.28 Six major private oil finns accounted for nearly all 
of these additional exports since state-owned finns barelyexpanded production. 
This expansion of oil exports accounted for about a quarte r of Russia 's growth in 
2001 _4.29 Russia had a kind of resource wind fall, therefore, even before the 
better-known spike in energy prices between 2005 and 2008. Both booms pro-
475 vided mean s to transfer value from the energy sectors to the rest of the 
economy so that it continued to be a hybrid, between the ' nonnaJ' market and 
the virtual economy.~ This hybridi ty was a function of the degree to which 
the Russian economy remained outside global economic structures under the 
tutelage of the Russian state and Putin 's regime. 
480 Third, and on the back of these energy booms, there was the central bank 
intervention in currency markets to tl)' to protect Russian industry from 
imports and maintain competitiveness. The Russian Cenlfal Bank in tervened 
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heavily in the foreign exchange markellO slow the appreciation of the rouble. 
Appreciation was still significant and fast, so the bank was constantly chasing 
a moving and cosily target. However, the bank could deal wi th this thanks 10 
the massive revenues earned from oil and gas sales. This massive intervention 
485 helped maintain some induslrial competitiveness by leaving the rouble unde r-
val ued by about 10-20 per cent (depending on the methodology used 10 cal-
culate value).31 This was, in effect, another subsidy 10 Russian producers -
another transfer of value from energy sectors made through the stale - but 
it was only partially successful since increases in the volume of imports 
490 grew at a greater rate than domestic production so thai there was, excluding 
oil and gas, a growing trade deficil.32 In many ways, Putin was getting the 
worst of both worlds, using the centml bank to subsidize domestic-orientated 
indusrry from oil revenues but still seeing its uncompetitive nature as imports 
grew using oil money and as this money funded the growth of non-tradable 
495 sectors in construction and services. As. the international financial crisis hit 
Russia, labour and capital productivity were only 26 per cent that of the 
USA in the sectors analysed on one report.33 
Finally, global economic growth, the revenues generated by the record 
global energy prices and the availability of cheap credit in the USA and 
500 Europe meant that it was cheap for Russia's major businesses to borrow in 
foreign currency: on average the rouble cost of dollar loans was I per cent 
between 2003 and mid_2007.34 There was, therefore, a flurry of borrowing 
by Russia's major finns such as the aluminium concern Rusal, and by many 
state-owned finns including the oil company Rosneft (which borrowed to 
505 finance its purchase of Yukos) and Gazprom, the gas giant (which borrowed 
to finance its development of the Sakhalin projects lost by BP). This was 
partly to generate investment revenue for development in Russia in the 
absence of a developed domestic banking sector, partly to fund purchases 
outside Russia as finns bought both upstream and downstream, and developed 
510 as global players in areas such as metals and energy. The scale of this borrow-
ing can be seen in Figure 2, which shows the precipitous rise in such borrow-
ing outside of the financial sector in Russia. This suited the Russian 
government, since it created invesnnenl., and suited the finns involved, 
since it spread their assets and sometimes their ownership beyond Russia, 
515 thus freeing them from some of the risk to economic actors inherent in a patri-
monial capitalist system. The vel)' low rates at which borrowing took place 
represented a subsidy from energy production to the borrowers, and this gen-
emted Russia's credit rating, inflated Russian growth mtes, and made Russia 
an altmctive emerging market to foreign investors. External borrowing 
520 reached $307bn in June 2008 outside the financial sector, wi th that sector 
borrowing about $200bn in June 2008 - all told some 40 per cent of gross 
domestic product (GDP).35 
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FIG URE 2 
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The Fragility of Putin 's Achievement: Russian Patrimonial Capitalism 
and Crisis 
What Putin achieved was thus a better-funded and more stable fonn of the 
540 economic system than what had emerged under Yeltsin. This economic 
system was still not integrated into the global economy, since vast parts of 
it were outside global chain s of production and financing, although it was 
exposed to it owing to energy dependency and private borrowing. Cumulat-
ively, this meant that the growing economic power of the government, 
545 based first on Putin 's taming of the 'oligarchs' and then on the development 
of the system of ' managed democracy', was protecting consumption and exist-
ing economic prac tices rather than transfonning them. Rising state revenues, 
derived directly from energy taxes and indirectly from taxes on imports, meant 
that Putin was able to stabilize his regime and carry on the fundamental 
550 business of the state with ease not available to Yeltsin. There was some 
greater latitude in dealing with outside pressure, following the paying down 
of foreign debts. But these were not sol utions to Russia's larger problems of 
development, and ran the risk of damaging the Russian economy outside 
the hydroc arbon secto r. The boom of revenue from energy sales threatened 
S5S 10 rni~ Ihe muhle's val ue and un(lercul Ihe comperili vene.~s (al re.'ldy low on 
quality and technological standards) of many Russian goods, in other words, 
to expose it to the ' Dutch disease'. This would erode many of the gains 
made in ex panding output since the crisis of 1998. Moreover, Russia could 
not expect energy prices or rents to remain high. Even ignoring price f1uctu-
5«l ations, the high rates of resource exploitation by private finns and relatively 
low levels of investment meant that future levels of produc tion - and hence 
revenue - were uncertain. Low investment in energy sectors in comparison 
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wi th levels of profit meanlilial high levels of ex ploitation of energy could nOI 
continue ; low investment in the rest of the economy meant that the future fi scal 
base of the government was nOI growing. Political conrrol was also nOI a g uar-
antee of future revenue i f certain Siale prerogati ves, such as conrrol over the 
565 infrastructure of e ne rgy exports, in particular pi pelines, was challenged. 
Such a challenge would c ui the revenues both for regime maintenance and 
for Siale fonnalion and econo mic development. 
Securing the longer-Ienn political stabiliry of the Pulin regime thus led 
towards a greater political involvement in the economy to secure sources of 
570 rent, 10 reduce their availabili ty 10 o ilie r actors, and 10 have the m at the 
slale's d isposal if it needed them for patronage, for funding basic functi ons, 
and possibly for developme nt. The stabi lization of Russia's patrimo nial capit-
alism thus took on an increasingly economic dimension as the role of the Slate 
in the economy grew. This stabi lization of patrimonial capitalism did not look 
575 as though it would pose a major threat to Russia since the ex pansion of fore ign 
reserves and the creatio n of a stabi lization fund based on the huge energy earn-
ings appeared to ensure that the state could maintain expenditure in the event 
of a shortfall in revenues caused by a decline in the price of energy. 36 Indeed, 
such was the build-up of reserves that by late 2007 Putin appeared able to 
580 maintain the sta te's functions and expand its role in develo pment without 
e ndangering support for the regime that might be expected if refonn 
imposed costs o n econo mic interests. Thus, the time thus seemed right for 
the state to move to a more ac ti ve role in the economy, as outlined by Putin 
when in early 2008 he introduced a develo pment plan to take Russia to 
585 2020.31 Problems remained about how to the plan was to work and the QI 
capaci ty of the Russian economy to absorb investment effectively. Plans 
announced in early 2008 for an invesnnent fund would, some experts con-
tended, have favoured existing industrial stru ctures and given regional auth-
o rities access to off-budget fund s for local projects.3S The development 
590 plan, in other words, looked like a means of rransfening resources to the exist-
ing economic structure so that it replicated itself and continued to provide 
support to the regime.39 But some suc h problems were inevitable, given the 
general difficulty t hat all resource-rich economies have in absorbing invest-
me nt resources witho ut waste. If the end result had been that some of the 
595 national corporatio ns and projects pl anned by Putin had succeeded, then the 
waste might have been worth the risk: Putin and subsequently Medvedev 
would have managed the di fficult task of simultaneously managing and rrans-
fonning patrimonial capitalism. 
The crisis of 2008 means that we can never know whether Putin 's plans 
600 would have come to fruition. It is probable that they would not have, o r at 
least not have done so simply. Even before the c risis, it was doubtful that 
Russia could have funded the growth that it planned and at the same time 
	  RUSSIAN PATRIMQNlALCAPITALISM 449 
maintained the equilibrium that it had achieved under Putin.40 As. matters 
turned out, the crisis forced a retrenchment. It hit Russia from three angles: 
first, there was spill-over from the international financial crisis; second 
global energy prices fell; and third, confidence in Russia fell owing to the 
605 war with Georgia, which led to capital flight and tightened lending to 
Russia.41 Together these lowered Russia's growth, hit its budget, and raised 
the costs of its state and private finns' borrowing. In many ways, the govern-
mental response was in line with the responses made by governments else-
where to the crisis in 2008-9: it increased its spending in order to tl)' to 
610 alleviate the crisis and provide credit in the economy. It was helped in this 
by its reserve funds built up from oil wealth, so that it was not pushed quite 
as far into deficit as would otherwise have been the case, given the falling 
of tax revenues as energy prices fell. The fonn that this relief took reflected 
the peculiarities of Russia's economy, however, and worked to support the 
615 equilibrium that Putin had achieved rather than to break with it. 
Whereas, much effort in liberal capitalist economies was concentrated on 
replacing (or stabilizing) the banks as lenders, Russian policy supported, 
stabilized and preserved the politically sensi tive areas of the economy, and 
reduced their exposure to foreign influences. Initially this focused on alleviat-
620 ing pressure on elements of the Russian economy that had made use of cheap 
credit in the USA and Europe and borrowed heavily in foreign currency. This 
credit was no longer cheap, as falling oil prices and the fallout of the Georgian 
war put pressure on the rouble and threatened to mise the costs of debt repay-
ment. As Figure 2 revealed, that debt had grown dmmatically and in particular 
625 had been built up by Russian finns, rather than banks - indeed, by major finns. 
As the rouble began to slide with falling energy prices, and as foreign capital 
fled Russia or simply dried up, the costs of repaying loans rose and the possi-
bility of rolling them over decreased. The state stepped in to relieve the 
pressure on these finns. It did so, first, by delaying the devaluation of the 
630 rouble so as to slow the rate at which the cost of loan repayments grew. 
This was litue more than a wai t-and-see policy, created by a belief that the 
fall in energy prices would be short-lived and that the negative economic 
affects of the Georgian war would dissipate, and by a misplaced confidence 
that had led Medvedev, Putin and the government to see crisis initially as 
635 an American problem. 
This head-in-the-sand position could notlasl, however, as it soon began to 
dmin the state 's reserves too rapidly, threatening the state's ability to mediate 
between the domestic and the global economy and threatening its management 
of the patrimonial capitalist system. A variety of anti-crisis measures were, 
640 therefore, introduced throughout 2008 and into 2009. Again, the chief focus 
of this was to relieve the pressure on the major finns - some state-owned -
that had foreign loans. Generally speaking, therefore, companies at the apex 
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of the economy benefited most from the anti-crisis measures, and the relation-
ship of the internationalized sectors of the Russian economy 10 the global 
economy was maintained. The government essentially look over their debts, 
directly and indirectly, by providing government credit guamntees and interest 
645 rate subsidies, stalling lax payments, and setting preferential export and import 
tari ffs. The chief beneficiaries of these policies were e nergy finns, metals pro-
ducers and oilier renl-genemling finns, and those whose closure would have 
the greatest social impact because of the dominance of local economies 
(one-company IOwnS).42 This minimized the damage 10 the eli tes and 10 
650 those areas of the country where the economic downturn would have 
sparked protest, while keeping the government at the centre of the economic 
game. The cost fell both on households, as devaluation eventually decreased 
real wages, and on finns that lacked access to the government's largesse. 
Some of these briefl y revened to the practices of barter and non-monetary 
655 exchange that had kept them 'solvent' in the 19905.43 
The anti-crisis measures that were adopted thus supponed eli te interests 
rather than fostering the diversification of the economy through the protection 
of small and medium enterprises. In general, these smaller finns genemlly 
benefited only partially and at second hand from the anti-crisis measures. 
660 So, when the crisis began to abate at the end of 2009, recovery was not 
based on any change in economic activity but was led, once more, by the 
oil sector and dri ven by the stabilization of the oil price over the last 
months of 2009. The prospects of any change from this reliance on oil were 
also probably reduced by the anti-crisis measures. Although the anti-crisis 
665 measures staved off the collapse of Russia's banks, they were nevenheless 
weakened, and their borrowing power - and hence their ability to channel 
money into the wider economy - was reduced. The large finns bailed out 
by the government have been able to roll their debts over and extend their 
credit, thanks to the support of the government, but Russian banks were 
670 unable to do SO.44 As. a result, lending to finns by Russian banks was small 
in the aftennath of the c risis, and the banks ' position was weakened and 
made more dependent on the state. 
'75 Conclusion 
The crisis did not mark a break with the past: in the words of one group of 
Russian analysts, 'the opportunities that the crisis offered for modernization 
were wasted' .45 Russia was cushioned by its wealth and saved by a stabiliz-
ation of oil prices that kept them within the range ($60-70 a barrel) at 
680 which its budget was forecast to break even. In the end, the anti-crisis 
measures amounted to another tmnsfer of social wealth genemted by the 
energy boom to the apex of the economy, wi th litue appreciable gain in 
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tenns of dealing with the problems that had exposed Russia to the crisis in the 
first place. The reliance on oil was deep. The total budget deficit caused by the 
c risis and the measures ado pted to deal wi th it was modest, about 6.4 per cent 
of GOP, but the non-oil de ficit was more than twice this as a percentage of 
685 GOP and far in excess of estimates of what would be sustain able from oil rev-
e nues over the longer tenn.46 The b'ansfonnati ve affects o f this spending, 
however, were weak because of its concentmtion on minimizing the ex posure 
of large finns; many of the anti-crisis measures have been described as inef-
fec tive, and were introduced only after the crisis had passed.41 As one 
690 Russian analyst has put it, the 'government continues the game as before ... 
There is no guarantee that the allocated money will be used to develop 
advanced technologies and expand production, rather than to cover losses or 
new currency and fin ancial specul ation,.48 
In the short tenn, the refo re, the crisis o nly dinted the stability of the patri-
695 monial capitalist system. But the longer tenn may be different. The crisis has 
called into doubt patrimonial capitalism as an inclusive economic fonn, 
capable of generating resources fo r d istribution beyond e lite groups. This 
promise of Putinism was always fmg ile, given the huge wealth disparities in 
Russia inherited from the 1990s, but it was pl ausible when oil revenues 
700 helped to increase incomes in the past decade. The crisis has also de fl ated 
the financial cushion that before 2008 had been avail able to su pport the patri-
mo nial capitalis t system as modernization was carned out. This has largely 
d isappeared owing to the state's resistance to devalu ation of the rouble and 
its takeover of the fo reign debts of major finns. This means that resources 
705 to manage the inherent in stability of the patrimonial capitalis t system -
resources that Russia temporarily had in the early years of this century -
have to be found wi thin the system, since they canno t be repl aced easily by 
foreign lending, given the continuing problems of the euro zone, the weakness 
of much of Western recovery, and the fac t that other emerging markets are 
710 mo re attractive than Russia's. Some effort is obviously being made to find 
these resources : proposed cuts to Russia's civil selVice and talk of public 
sector modernization are aimed both at making efficiency gains in public 
admin istration and at giving more room for manoeuvre in state spending. 
However, such savings are likely to be relatively modest compared with the 
715 spending put in place during the crisis and funded by oil. They will not 
provide the room to manoeuvre that whic h existed before the crisis or the 
wherewithal to fund modernization while accommod ating the inefficiencies 
of the patrimo nial capitalist system. As Medvedev noted in his 2009 'state 
of the nation' address, the crisis has made ' it harder to resolve [developmental] 
no problems' .49 The crisis has thus left Russia more exposed to the dangers 
inherent in the patrimonial capitalist model; it is less able to deal with the 
demands pl aced on it for resource redislribution and for the maintenance of 
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Siale functions and 10 cope with the demand s of being a part of the global 
economy. Consequently, in the longer lenn, the great international crisis of 
2008 onwards may be for Russia the precursor 10 the crisis of its own econ-
omic model, and such a crisis would be much more dmmatic and politically 
725 unsettling. 
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